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NOTES
The Application of the First Amendment
to Long Arm Jurisdiction
Connor, an Alabama official, brought an action for an alleged libel
against the New York Times, a New York corporation which had no per-
manent offices or employees in Alabama. The trial court found that the
small circulation of the Times in Alabama (395 daily and 2,455 Sunday
copies) was sufficient contact with that state to sustain jurisdiction under
the Alabama long arm statute. The Times appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
Held, reversed: Because of first amendment principles surrounding the law
of libel, a foreign publisher must have greater contact with the forum
than a non-publisher to be subject to jurisdiction therein. New York
Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
In a similar fact situation, Buckley, a Connecticut resident, brought a
libel action against the New York Post, a Delaware corporation. The Post
had no offices in Connecticut but maintained a small circulation of its
papers there; insufficient, according to the trial court, to hold the Post
amenable to service pursuant to the Connecticut long arm statute.' Buck-
ley appealed to the Second Circuit. Held, reversed: The distribution of
2,000 newspaper copies by a foreign corporation with allegedly libelous
material about a resident of Connecticut is sufficient contact with that
state to sustain jurisdiction. Buckley v. New York Post, 373 F.2d 175
(2d Cir. 1967).
I. HISTORY OF THE LONG ARM STATUTE
Historically, jurisdiction over foreign corporations had been predicated
upon such restrictive tests as corporate presence' and corporate consent.'
These mechanical tests were discarded in International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington," in favor of a less restrictive qualitative test based upon the
"
tnature and quality" of the defendant's acts within the forum. Under this
standard, to be amenable to service a foreign corporation needed only such
"minimum contacts" with the forum that "the maintenance of the suit
did not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice."' In McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co.6 the Supreme Court extended the standard to
uphold jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company whose only contact
1Buckley v. New York Post, 260 F. Supp. 282 (D. Conn. 1966).
'See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1856).
4326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5Id. at 316. See also Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963)
where the court noted various factors comprising the "minimum contacts" standard. Accordingly,
the factors included: (1) the nature and character of the defendant's business; (2) the number and
types of activity within the forum by the defendant; (3) whether or not the defendant's activities
give rise to a cause of action; (4) whether the forum has some special interest in granting relief;
(5) the relative convenience of the parties.
8335 U.S. 220 (1957).
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with the forum was the mailing of an insurance renewal policy to a resi-
dent of that state.
In response to the broad assertions of personal jurisdiction invited by
International Shoe and McGee, several states, including Connecticut and
Alabama, have enacted long arm statutes." Pursuant to these statutes, jur-
isdiction has generally been limited by the "minimum contacts" standard
set forth in International Shoe.' Corporations have generally met this
standard and jurisdiction has been upheld if the corporation has been
"doing business" in the forum.9 Conversely, if a foreign corporation has
not been "doing business" in the forum, the "minimum contacts" neces-
sary to satisfy due process have not been found and jurisdiction has not
been upheld." Some courts have combined the "doing business" concept
with any tortious conduct of the defendant within the forum in order to
sustain jurisdiction under a long arm statute." Other courts have held that
tortious conduct alone is sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts"
standard.1" Even committing a single tort within a forum, irrespective of
any business transaction there, has been held to be sufficient contact to sus-
tain jurisdiction.a But in determining jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions, regardless of whether the courts looked to business activity, tortious
conduct, or to a combination of both, the ultimate decision since Interna-
tional Shoe has depended upon whether or not the "looked to" activity
measured up to the "minimum contacts" standard.
'The two sections of the Connecticut long arm statute pertaining to jurisdiction over foreign
corporations were adopted in 1959 and became effective in 1961. CONN. GEN. STrAT. ANN. §
33-411 (1966) provides for jurisdiction over foreign corporations:
(3) Out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporations
with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in
this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were
produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium
of independent contractors or dealers; or
(4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity
or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
ALA. CODn tit. 7, § 199(1) (1960) provides for jurisdiction as follows:
Any corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing
business herein, who shall do any business or perform any character of work or serv-
ices, shall be deemed to have appointed the secretary of state, or his successor or
successors in office, to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of such non-resident,
upon whom process may be served in any action accrued or accruing from the doing
of such business, or the performing of such works, or service, or as an incident thereto
by any such non-resident, or his, its or their agent, servant or employee ...
'Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach.
Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948); Grace v. Procter & Gamble Co., 95 N.H. 74, 57 A.2d 619
(1948); Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
9Worley's Beverages Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.C. 1958); Allegue v.
Gulf of South America S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Perkins v. Berguet Consolidated Mining Co., 155 Ohio 116,
98 N.E.2d 33 (1951).
'*Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Canvas Fabricators v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 199 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1952); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960); Cole v. Stone-
hard Co., 12 F.R.D. 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1952); Read v. Corbitt Co., 10 F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
"Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
"Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824
(1963); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961). For an interesting
opinion that equates tortious conduct with doing business for jurisdictional purposes, see Hill v.
Electronics Corp. of America, 253 Iowa 581, 113 N.W.2d 313 (1962).
"Elkart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965).
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II. APPLICATION OF LONG ARM STATUTES TO PUBLISHERS
Since International Shoe, the same "minimum contacts" standard has
generally been applied in determining jurisdiction over foreign publisher
corporations.14 Thus, jurisdiction under a long arm statute was sustained
where a court found that a foreign publisher had "minimum contacts"
with the forum by virtue of its "doing business"1 therein, committing a
tort 8 therein, or by a combination of both activities." Applying the broad
jurisdiction standard, jurisdiction was upheld over a foreign publisher
who had no offices or employees in the forum and whose only contact was
the circulation of a few copies of allegedly libelous material within the
forum,"s and over a foreign publisher whose only contact with a forum
was the mailing of an alleged libel to independent distributors in the
forum. 9
Applying the same standard, jurisdiction was not upheld where a for-
eign publisher distributed 26 daily copies of an alleged libel within a for-
um;" or where the publisher circulated 391 daily copies of an alleged libel
and solicited small amounts of advertising from the forum;"1 or where
the foreign publisher's total contact with the forum consisted of the
mailing of periodicals to subscribers and independent distributors within
the forum.'
On the other hand, some courts, without indicating a reason, have clear-
ly applied a variation of the "minimum contacts" standard to foreign pub-
lishers. Consequently, a few courts, while purporting to apply the tradi-
tional jurisdictional standard, denied jurisdiction over publishers where the
same contact with the forum was apparently sufficient to sustain jurisdic-
tion over non-publishers.' In one such case a foreign publisher was not
subject to jurisdiction in a forum even though the publisher owned realty
there and received about 3.2 per cent of its total business from that forum."
This decision was predicated on an earlier case which held that a foreign
publisher was not amenable to service even though it maintained offices
"4St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966); Brandon v. Memphis Pub. Co., 194
F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959); Gayle
v. Magazine Management Co., 153 F. Supp. 861 (M.D. Ala. 1957); Putnam v. Triangle Pub. Inc.,
245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). Jurisdiction over a foreign publisher is complicated by the
conflict of laws problem surrounding the single and multiple publication rules. This Note, however,
will attempt to deal only with the first amendment and its application to foreign publishers.
15Manning v. Time, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. La. 1964); Hunter v. Afro-American Co.,
133 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1955); Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
16Bible v. T.D. Pub. Co., 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Manning v. Time, Inc., 233
F. Supp. 985 (E.D. La. 1964).
" Brandon v. Memphis Pub. Co., 194 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Totero v. World Tele-
gram Corp., 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
"8 Brandon v. Memphis Pub. Co., 194 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
"'Bible v. T.D. Pub. Co., 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
18Walker v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 332 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1964).
21 Buckley v. New York Times, 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
"'Walker v. Savell, 218 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Miss. 1963).
23 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966); Insull v. New York World Tele-
gram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aft'd, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 942 (1960); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 141 F. Supp. 760 (D. Me. 1956);
Putnam v. Triangle Pub., Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
" Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 141 F. Supp. 760 (D. Me. 1956).
and employees in the forum and received nearly 30 per cent of its total vol-
ume of business from that forum.' Moreover, the Fifth Circuit held that
the distribution of 69,000 copies of an alleged libel was not, by itself, suf-
ficient contact with the forum to permit the court to uphold jurisdiction
over a foreign publisher."
Although the above cases do not clearly manifest a reason for applying
a variation of the "minimum contacts" to foreign publishers, one possible
explanation lies in the first amendment concepts. In Putnam v. Triangle
Pub. Inc." the Supreme Court of North Carolina expressly attributed to
the first and fourteenth amendments a requirement that the court adopt
a more narrow standard when determining jurisdiction over foreign pub-
lishers. In Walker v. Savelr s the Fifth Circuit stated that, because of the
necessity to protect the freedoms guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments, it was the established policy of the state of Mississippi to re-
quire more than minimal contacts with that state to sustain jurisdiction
over a foreign published. In Buckley v. New York Post"5 the trial court
indicated that first amendment considerations necessarily find their way
into jurisdictional assessment over foreign publishers because the law of
libel represents an effort to balance the competing interests favoring free-
dom of the press and protection of reputation.
IIl. BUCKLEY AND CONNOR
Thus, while it is apparent that most courts have rather indiscrimin-
ately applied the "minimum contacts" standard to foreign publishers and
non-publishers alike, there does exist, in a minority of courts, a distinct
variation of this standard when applied to foreign publishers. This appar-
ent variation of the "minimum contacts" standard is sharply contrasted
in Buckley and Connor. In Connor the Fifth Circuit extended this varia-
tion by openly declaring that the traditional standard, applicable in ob-
taining jurisdiction over other foreign corporations, is not applicable to
foreign publishers defending against a libel action. The court reasoned that
the freedom of press and speech, guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments, requires a higher jurisdictional standard in the case of a for-
eign publisher. According to the Fifth Circuit, first amendment principles
must be extended to jurisdictional concepts in order to protect foreign
publishers from abusive and vexatious litigation resulting from the appli-
cation of the traditional "minimum contacts" standard. Supposedly, such
litigation would tend to discourage foreign publishers from distributing
in less profitable foreign states.'
"Lee v. Memphis Pub. Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351 (1943), Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1428
(1944).
26Curtis Pub. Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
27245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
20335 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1964).
29 260 F. Supp. 282, 285 (D. Conn. 1966).
0 The Fifth Circuit does not cite any evidence to indicate that foreign publishers have actually
been discouraged from distributing in distant areas. For an interesting discussion of this aspect of
the libel law, see Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Trans-
lation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 n.2 (1964).
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By engrafting principles of the first amendment upon jurisdictional con-
cepts, the Fifth Circuit purports to lighten the potentially heavy burden
placed upon foreign newspapers under the "minimum contacts" standard.
The decision by the Fifth Circuit favors a less restricted circulation of
foreign newspapers by affording such corporations special protection from
the reach of long arm statutes.
In Buckley, however, the Second Circuit found no reason for super-
imposing a first amendment standard upon the application of long arm
statutes. Instead, the Second Circuit was content to resolve the jurisdic-
tional problems by applying the traditional "minimum contacts" standard
to uphold jurisdiction over the Post in Connecticut. Applying this stand-
ard, the Second Circuit declared that the distribution of 2,000 copies of an
alleged libel about a resident of Connecticut was sufficient contact with
that state to uphold jurisdiction." In so deciding, the court specifically
rejected the Fifth Circuit's first amendment standard."'
The Second Circuit also noted that a free press system, capable of fur-
nishing the public with fresh, contrasting ideas, is indeed essential, but that
the hazards to publishers from libel actions have been recently mitigated
by the Supreme Court, notably in New York Times v. Sullivan." Thus,
while both courts considered the importance of the first amendment in
libel actions, the Second Circuit basically confined its application to sub-
stantive law, whereas the Fifth Circuit superimposed constitutional free-
doms upon procedural rules, thereby giving foreign publishers additional
protection which would enable them to escape burdensome suits without
the normal trial and appeal process.
To support Connor, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the recent freedom of
speech cases, in which the Supreme Court greatly restricted the discretion
exercisable by the jury in deciding whether or not a given case falls within
the "privileged" category.' In these cases, however, the Supreme Court
attacked the problem of jury discretion on the substantive level by impos-
ing certain limitations to be applied at the trial.' The Court, though it em-
phasized that first amendment considerations required greater protection
for publishers, did not, in any of these cases, go beyond making substantive
modifications. In Connor the central problem is analogous to these cases
insofar as it involves the conduct and discretion of the judge and jury in
libel cases. But the addition of the first amendment to jurisdictional con-
cepts, as proposed by the Fifth Circuit, does nothing to solve the prob-
lem. Instead, the suggested approach merely inconveniences the plaintiff
31 Buckley v. New York Post, 373 F.2d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 1967).
3id. at 182.
33 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The major safeguard provided by Sullivan was the Court's ruling that
the element of malice must be shown in order for a public official to recover damages for an alleged
libel, provided, of course, that the libel was connected with the official status of the plaintiff. The
public official concept has recently been extended to include public figures, one of whom was a
chemistry professor. Pauline v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
' New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
See also Pauline v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966).
' The Court has extended the protection to publishers by requiring malice to be proved before
a public official can recover damages in a libel action and by expanding the public official concept
to include public figures of all sorts.
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by compelling him to seek the defendant in a different, perhaps distant
forum, where the problem of uncertainty at the trial court level will once
again be squarely in issue.
Nevertheless, the protection afforded by Connor does have several ad-
vantages. First, it reduces the chances of a foreign publisher losing a libel
suit at the hands of a local jury and being compelled to pay enormous
damages. This is particularly desirable when a foreign publisher has at-
tempted to report highly controversial issues, perhaps inflammable by their
very nature.' This danger is further complicated by the fact that the law
of libel itself allows the judge and jury great latitude in construing the
law to the detriment of a foreign defendant." As a second advantage, the
special protection afforded foreign newspapers might tend to encourage
continued newspaper service to distant areas which might otherwise be
economically unfeasible."a This aspect of Connor is particularly warranted
because many areas are restricted to one local newspaper, and therefore
often depend upon a foreign newspaper for broader coverage" or a differ-
ent viewpoint. ' Much, then, can be said in favor of the Connor decision
if the protection afforded by the application of the first amendment to
jurisdictional concepts can guarantee a continued variety of news coverage.
Aside from any advantages, however, the incorporation of the first
amendment into the jurisdictional standard, as proposed in Connor, inevi-
tably results in several undesired consequences. First, and most obvious,
is the fact that the Fifth Circuit outlined a new standard for obtaining
jurisdiction over publishers without defining the standard. The court mere-
ly stated that a foreign publisher must have greater contact with a forum
than a non-publisher in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of that
forum." Just what greater contacts are necessary is left unanswered, except
that the circulation of 395 daily copies and 2,455 Sunday copies of an
alleged libel within a forum is not sufficient contact." Furthermore, the
first amendment standard proposed by the Fifth Circuit would prevent a
state from protecting its own residents, regardless of the damage inflicted,
"0 As illustrative, see the record in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also
the discussion of Sullivan in 43 N.C.L. REv. 315, 348 (1965). In Buckley, the Second Circuit also
noted this aspect of the libel law and partially distinguished Connor on this basis:
The record affords no ground for a prediction that the added danger of a plaintiff's
verdict from having a libel suit by a resident tried in Connecticut rather than in
New York-presumably rather slight-would cause the Post to forgo the substantial
revenues from these sales and thus deprive Connecticut readers of its news and edi-
torials, as might have been the case if the Times were subjected to repeated libel suits
in southern states for articles on racial problems.
Buckley v. New York Post, 373 F.2d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 1967).
" See Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1,
55 (1966).
" A single news source to any given area could also create a "uniform" news system dependent
upon wire service reproductions. For a discussion of the consequences resulting from such uni-
formity, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afftd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); M. ERNST, FIRST FREEDOM 93 (1946).
'
9 See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
' The Supreme Court has recognized that the unfettered flow of information to the public is
essential for "fair" coverage, and that a variety of sources is therefore desirable. See Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).




so long as the defendant happens to be a foreign publisher. Therefore, in-
herent in this standard is the fact that the forum most appropriate to
determine the damages, most convenient to the witnesses, and generally
most convenient to the parties, is powerless to adjudicate. The problem is
further complicated when the defendant has clearly and maliciously li-
beled the plaintiff. For even in the clearest case of malice, a plaintiff would
not be afforded the protection of his own state courts."
Moreover, the application of the first amendment standard results in a
benefit for foreign publishers not shared by a resident publisher. The for-
eign publisher is permitted to escape the jurisdiction of a distant forum
although the resident publisher of that forum cannot invoke the first
amendment and achieve the same result. Thus, the existence of a state
border allows the foreign publisher to circumvent the trial and appeal pro-
cess. If this circumvention is designed to protect the freedom of the press
as a whole, then it fails in purpose because a resident publisher must still
take its chances with the normal trial and appeal process. Finally, the pro-
posed application of the first amendment creates a double standard, where-
by a distinction is drawn between foreign publishers and all other foreign
corporations. Accordingly, a foreign publisher is not subject to jurisdic-
tion under a long arm statute in a forum where it commits the tort of libel,
even though the same statute could be used to obtain jurisdiction over a
foreign manufacturer who commits a tort in that forum by circulating
a defective valve therein."
IV. CONCLUSION
The protection sought by the Fifth Circuit for foreign publishers can
be achieved without producing the undesirable consequences of Connor.
This result can be accomplished by appropriate substantive changes. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has already made substantial progress in this
area.' In fact, after refusing to sustain jurisdiction in Connor, the Fifth
Circuit went on to exonerate the Times on the merits, ironically basing
its decision on substantive developments, which the court had apparently,
and, if so, erroneously, believed to be an inadequate safeguard." By con-
fining the protections to substantive developments, the double standard
created by Connor is avoided. Furthermore, both foreign and resident pub-
lishers share the substantive benefits equally. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portant, appropriate substantive changes assure the continuation of a trial
and appeal process for all litigants in this area even when one party hap-
pens to be a foreign publisher.
Stanley R. Huller
'Thus, Connor goes farther than Sullivan by prohibiting a resident legal recourse in his own
state courts even when the requisite malice called for by the Supreme Court is or can be shown.
"See Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
4' See note 33 supra. There is still much room for modification on the substantive level as in-
dicated by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 297 (1964), where he called for the complete abolition of libel suits involving public officials.
"New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1966).
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